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ABSTRACT: The keynote contributes to critical analysis of religion and attendant 
categories by proposing that religions be understood as vestigial states. According 
to this hypothesis, religion is a modern discursive product that is not present in the 
Bible. The category evolves as a management strategy, a technology of statecraft to 
contain and control conquered, colonized and/or marginalized populations as an 
alternative to genocide. Examples are drawn from Greek mythology, Jewish and 
Druid history and recent Buddhist politics. The author uses texts pertaining to 
international law and political philosophy to argue that viewing religion as 
synonymous with displaced, uneasy, former government opposes male hegemony 
by revealing the political structure of mystified nostalgia for male leadership.  She 
also maintains that understanding religions as restive governments promotes 
clarity in regard to contemporary conflicts between religious freedom and equality 
rights.  Psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein and Wilfrid Bion 
are cited to support the disassembling of foundational terms of Religious Studies.   
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Jules Coleman writes that “Progress [in a mature field of inquiry] can be 
made only if much of the conventional wisdom is displaced, and its central 
questions are reframed” (Coleman 2011, 184). 
My talk today is a critique of discursive borders and boundaries that 
have long characterized religious studies.  I am convinced that such 
critique, already underway through the work of many scholars, will 
displace conventional wisdom and reframe central questions in our field.   
The deconstruction of religion and attendant categories in the sub-
field that some are calling “critical religion” is crucial, I think, not only for 
improving academic analysis but also more broadly for promoting 
progressive politics.  The subject fascinates me to the point of obsession. 
Immersion in classical studies, feminist theory and psychoanalytic 
thought leads me to see critical religion through a particular lens.  
Hopefully, my description of this trajectory of thinking will be interesting 
to you and might even prove useful in your own work.  At the very least, I 
might succeed in convincing the skeptics among you that this is a line of 
argument to which in the words of playwright Arthur Miller, “attention 
must be paid” (Miller 1949). 
I’ll start with the text of Deuteronomy 20, lines 16 – 18: 
 
But as for the towns of these peoples that the Lord your God is 
giving you as an inheritance, you must not let anything that 
breathes remain alive.  You shall annihilate them - the Hittites and 
the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizzites, the Hivites and the 
Jebusites – just as the Lord your God has commanded, so that they 
may not teach you to do all the abhorrent things that they do for 
their gods, and you thus sin against the Lord your God.   
 
God’s instructions regarding the towns given as “an inheritance” are as 
clear as they are harsh.  According to the previous five verses, gentler 
treatment is ordered for other cities that are “very far from you, which are 
not towns of the  nations here” (Deut. 20: 15).  If the people of these places 
offer no resistance, they can become colonies to be exploited; if they resist, 
after their downfall, all males are to be executed, while the women, 
children, and livestock are to be taken as spoils.  Even so, whether in 
surrender or defeat, the fate of those distant towns is preferable to those 
inherited ones closer to home. 
In her book, The Misunderstood Jew:  The Church and the Scandal of the 
Jewish Jesus, Amy-Jill Levine writes that she is “appalled by the sanctioned 
genocide suggested by [this] passage in Deuteronomy…”(Levine 2006, 14).  
She goes on to derive the following lesson from such texts:  “The passages 
and the past should serve as reminders of the evils that humans perpetrate 
on each other in the name of religion” (Levine 2006, 15). 
Levine’s book has a worthy, ecumenical goal.  As a Jew and a 
prominent New Testament scholar, she promotes respectful, engaged 





dialog between Christians and Jews.  She advises that “one comes to the 
interfaith table not with guilt and not with entitlement, but with humility 
and interest” (Levine 2006, 14).    
I suggest that both dialog and scholarship pertaining to such texts 
and to the ideological and communal traditions of which they are a part 
ought to be characterized by another quality in addition to humility and 
interest – namely, critical sensibility toward the terms that have conditioned 
discussion for so long.  
Levine is correct that humans do “perpetrate evils on each other in 
the name of religion.”  However, her statement only applies to relatively 
recent history.  The group to which the God of Deuteronomy grants an 
inheritance and orders to commit genocide is surely not motivated by 
“religion.” That concept is yet to be invented.  Similarly, at this time, God 
could not command his people to fulfill his wishes with AR 15s.    
By expressing outrage about the role of “religion” in this mandate 
for slaughter, Levine is employing an anachronism to describe what is 
going on.  I suggest that such misdirection obscures machinations of power 
and governance in both ancient and contemporary times.   
The “Lord your God” in Deuteronomy 20 seems to aspire to control 
every aspect of the life of his polity.  The stated goal of the genocide is to 
insure no practice or bit of culture of the previous inhabitants of the land he 
is handing over to his people remains.  If the members of his group destroy 
all those who embody different ways of living – i.e. “all the abhorrent things 
they do for their gods” – his people will think of themselves as constituting 
a cohesive group in a jurisdiction over which he has absolute control.   
It will most probably appear counterintuitive if not nonsensical to 
those who are not familiar with current debates in religious studies to say 
that Deuteronomy 20 is not about religion.  After all, the terms of the 
passage explicitly refer to deities:    the “Lord your God” talks about his 
competitors as “other gods” and the travesties linked to them are translated 
as “sin”.  This is vocabulary that is now associated with “religion”- a word 
that, despite its capacious vagueness and malleability, is used (however 
problematically and paradoxically) to indicate a distinct sphere of human 
conduct.  The Lord God of Deuteronomy is not confining himself to setting 
out rules for specific bounded activities and practices of his people.  Au 
contraire, he is concerned with total control.  God and “gods” in 
Deuteronomy are referents whose scope and range we can only intuit from 
our vast temporal and cognitive distance.  Nevertheless, we can be quite 
sure that the linguistic and institutional distinctions currently conveyed by 
these words were not similarly operative in biblical times. 
Instead of using the term “religion” to reference what is going on in 
Deuteronomy 20, I suggest that we think of the genocide God orders as a 
tactic of government. Of course, the word government exists in 
contemporary vocabulary and is itself an anachronism when applied to the 
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particular ancient world of the text. In spite of this obvious truth, it is 
nevertheless useful to put the term “religion” out of play when thinking 
about or discussing this and other biblical passages.  My interest in 
bracketing out “religion” is not so much in order to depict the past with 
better accuracy (although this might be one probable result), but more for 
the sake of developing a clearer view of the present. By refraining from 
using “religion” as a descriptor in epochs in which it has not yet been 
invented, we can, I think, begin to see how and why “religion” became a 
technology of governance in structures we now call “states.”   
I want to argue that “religion” is an invention, a strategy, a 
technology, a tactic of management that among other things, can provide 
governments with an alternative to genocide.  It evolves in different times 
and places as a category that enables ruling entities to grant limited 
sovereignty to specific - possibly dissident - groups instead of eliminating 
them entirely.    
However, this is a solution that lacks the finality that would come 
with thorough eradication. Groups given special jurisdictional status could 
challenge the boundaries imposed on their spheres of authority and 
eventually expand them.  There is also the additional risk, recognized by 
the God of Deuteronomy, that the larger population might adopt habits and 
customs of the only partially vanquished group and thus destabilize the 
ruling order from within. 
I have been working on a theory to take account of the evolution of 
‘religion’ as a tool of statecraft for the containment and management of 
distinct and possibly rebellious groups whose status is understood as 
having been reduced by a newer ruling order.  I argue that religions 
function as vestigial states composed of mutating institutions and 
ideologies that exist in relation to the dominant governing order that 
contains and defines them.  Vestigial states are permitted some authority 
over particular behavioral or territorial jurisdictions pertaining to specific 
populations.  They are ‘once and future’ governments, alternative ruling 
orders, governments in waiting that are commonly narrated as having once 
exercised broader powers in fair and beneficent ways superior to those of 
the present government (Goldenberg 2015; 2018; 2019). 
In some instances, the fully empowered better governing order is not 
thought of as in the past, but rather is projected into the future with the idea 
of another world to come after death.  Groups sometimes called “new 
religious movements” can be very creative about the location of the 
superior ruling order.   It can be imagined as happening on another planet 
or on this planet after radically changed circumstances brought on by an 
apocalypse.  Although vestigial states might be restive and ambitious to 
expand their influence and authority, their members can also, for long 
periods of time, be satisfied with the spheres of jurisdiction accorded them. 





Vestigial states can be useful to dominant states to support and 
aggrandize power by references to mystified, always previous, authority 
that supposedly justifies contemporary governance. The United States 
routinely cites forms of Christianity for such a purpose.   
 
That the “state” is itself a modern concept is sometimes raised as an 
objection to problematizing “religion” as a recent invention.  To clarify: I 
am not claiming that something now called a state is more ancient than 
something now called religion.  What I am to pointing to as significant is 
the development of a concept of governance that is supposedly separate 
from a recently imagined sphere of thought and behavior termed 
“religion.”  This assumed distinctive entity is what I am joining other 
scholars in describing as novel, modern and without the particularly deep 
historical, ‘ancient’ roots that are frequently claimed.   
According to Ernst Kantorowicz in his fulsome study, The King’s Two 
Bodies, “state” as a broad term for governing structure evolves from at least 
the time of Aquinas when “status,” meaning “status publicus” is used as a 
general description of “government” without the “connotation of 
abstractness” (Kantorowicz 2016 [1957], 271 n. 235).  I am using the word in 
this broad sense to refer to governing structure, ruling authority, or 
dominant regulator. 
Kantorowicz’ analysis also supports my emphasis on the consonance 
of concepts of “state” with similar structures that have come to be labeled 
“religion.” He unravels classic legal, philosophical and theological texts that 
attach theistic notions of supernatural destiny and eternal endurance to 
governments of first Roman and then Christian heritage.  Kantorowicz 
shows that the Roman notion of patria as gesturing toward a glorious 
aggregate of polity that is worth dying for was greatly enhanced through 
the idea of the double nature of Christ (Kantorowicz 2016 [1957], 232 
passim).  Christ as Lord both human and divine evolves as a basis of law 
and statecraft (albeit unevenly and differently inflected) in Britain and the 
European mainland.  From the middle ages onward, governments, 
influenced by this legacy, whether or not self-described as ‘secular,’ go 
forward with a model that deifies and mystifies whatever principle or entity 
is posited as foundational – such as the rule of law, inalienable rights, a 
particular document, freedom, justice, or territorial jurisdiction.  I want to 
argue that states whether dominant and widely recognized as authoritative 
or vestigial and now currently known as religions, rest on a fluctuating mix 
of claims to transcendence and immanence.  Thus, are religions made of the 
same stuff as are the governing structures that name and contain them and 
limit their spheres of sovereignty.   
I do think Carl Schmitt’s famed utterances about theology and the 
state can support this argument.  In 1969, Schmitt states the analogy this 
way: “Everything I have said on the topic of political theology [are] 
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statements of a jurist upon the obvious theoretical and practical legal 
structural resemblance between theological and juridical concepts (Schmitt 
181, n. 15)  .” I particularly like this later form of Schmitt’s more frequently 
quoted sentence that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the 
state are secularized theological concepts.” I prefer the 1969 formulation 
because the word “secularized” isn’t there to confuse things and because 
yes indeed, the resemblance between what is called the “theological” and 
the “juridical” is stated as “obvious.” 
I want to push the genealogy of theological back further than I think 
many who use and cite Schmitt do.  I suggest it is an error to think of what 
now is called “theology” as separate from past regimes of practical rule, 
from past structures of governance.  Theology as it is now conceived arises 
only when the concept of gods has been diminished and restricted.  That 
there was something that could be called “theology” or a “theological 
construct” separate from law and government in the past is fantasy.  It is 
wrong, I think, to interpret Schmitt as saying that the theology now 
understood as distinct from secularized government predates 
contemporary government and thus looks like it.  Rather, it is more accurate 
to say that contemporary governments derive from past forms of 
government and that the “theological” as a distinct category has been 
invented and projected onto the past for strategic and rhetorical purposes.   
I first took note of the dynamic that I now understand as the 
superseding and taming of a previous sovereignty when I was an aspiring 
classicist keen on ancient Greek cosmology and genealogy.  I was struck by 
the transformation of the vile God Uranos in Hesiod’s Theogony.  After being 
castrated by his son Chronos, Uranos apparently reconciles with Gaia, who, 
in response to his cruelty toward their children, had commissioned his 
mutilation. In diminished form, Uranos morphs into a kindly yet distant 
wise counsellor. A similar, but more expansive and better written 
metamorphosis is described by Aeschylus in the Oresteia.  The bloodthirsty, 
bone-chilling Furies are tamed by Athena who, after defeating them in the 
forum of a court of law, leads them to a place below the earth and promises 
them eternal recognition and ritual honors.  These are poetic (and, in a 
sense, patriotic) accounts of the succession of ruling orders in which a 
previous government is moved away from the locus of contemporary 
power without being completely excised.  That which was once truly 
supreme is now merely idealized.  Uranos and the Furies are marginalized 
and simultaneously extolled.  It is no coincidence that, in their new, largely 
symbolic role, these deities become supports for the regime that displaced 
them.  The incorporation and laudatory citation of references to former, 
disempowered governments to bolster dominant regimes is a management 
technique that is observable currently.  For example, the invocation of God 
on documents and coins and the use of clergy on ceremonial occasions are 
now parts of the governing apparatus of U.S. and Canadian governments 





that are supposedly no longer justified by and beholden to ecclesial 
authorities.  
I am not saying that the displacement and subsequent gestures of 
veneration toward Uranos and the Furies are examples of the creation of 
“religion.” Even though these sidelined powers are labeled deities and, in 
the latter example are accorded specific rites, the category of religion (as 
other than a set of ceremonial practices connected with government) had 
not yet entered history.  Hesiod and Aeschylus are writing about the 
progression of governments. “Religion,” as a term and management 
technique for displaced and diminished government pertaining to a 
particular population, evolves much later in fits and starts in different 
histories and geographical contexts.   
In other work, I describe this process with a range of illustrations.  
Judaism, for example, becomes a “religion” gradually through millenia of 
violent displacements by Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans 
and, most recently, Germans (Goldenberg 2015).  Because, thankfully, none 
of these military solutions were final, the practices, customs, institutions, 
literature, laws and ideologies of the Jewish people became the material of 
Judaism, gradually molded into a “religion.”  Work by Leora Batnitzky in 
her 2011 book How Judaism Became a Religion traces  a part of this modern 
development from a time in which as she writes “….Judaism and 
Jewishness were all these at once:  religion, culture and nationality” 
(Batnitzky 2011, 2).   I agree with the argument she advances in this book 
that the concepts of nation-state and religion emerge together.  I understand 
my work as probing the paradox and illusion of the separation of this 
pairing.  In relation to Judaism specifically, Yishai Blank, refers to the “dual 
meaning of Jewish [as] both a religion and a nation…” (Blank 2017, 127). 
The argument I am outlining here clarifies, so to speak, the muddiness of 
this distinction not only in regard to Judaism, but as relates to “religion” as 
a category.  The example of Jewishness is particularly interesting because 
with the foundation of Israel as a nation-state and the growing prominence 
of the orthodox rabbinate in that state, one can see an instance in which 
what I am naming a vestigial state can take control of dominant governing 
ideology and institutional structures.  The narrative that accompanies this 
transformation will be one of idealized return to a ruling regime that was 
unjustly ousted in the deep past. 
I argue that understanding religion as a management mechanism is 
a useful hermeneutic in regard to long histories of groups such as the 
Druids.  In his account of the Gallic wars, Julius Caesar describes the Druids 
as in firm control of government.   After their defeat, they are diminished 
and exiled to Iona and some smaller islands.  Gradually, Druidism becomes 
a “religion” in Britain that is officially recognized as such for purposes of 
charity in 2010 – an evolution traced by Suzanne Owen and Teemu Taira in 
an excellent essay (Owen and Taira 2015).  
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I see the strategic use of the category of religion as operative in the 
Dalai Lama’s move in 2011 to declare himself  head of the religion of Tibetan 
Buddhism in distinction from an elected head of state.   He thereby 
undercuts the Chinese claim that the Panchen lama who is under Chinese 
control is the true leader of Tibet.  If the separation is recognized, the 
argument pertaining to the Panchen lama will concern only a diminished 
sphere called “a religion.”  
In his text titled The Creation of States in International Law, that is now 
a benchmark in legal theory, James Crawford writes that “despite the 
conclusion that statehood is not everything, the world has been 
homogenized into States” (Crawford 2006, 254).  He refers to the reduction 
of the number of what he calls “not-full-sovereign” entities as somewhat 
functional governing structures since “the early part” of this century.  I 
suggest “religions” now function as such entities and that the 
understanding of their nature as quasi states would help to clarify 
problems, paradoxes and trends of contemporary governments in which 





Crawford defines sovereignty as “the location of supreme power within a 
territorial unit,”(Crawford 2006, 12) and sees it rather paradoxically as both 
a criterion for and a consequence of statehood (Crawford 2006, 89).  He 
discusses five other features that characterize states:  1. Defined territory; 2.  
Permanent population; 3. Governing structure; 4. Capacity to enter into 
relations with other states; and 5. Independence (Crawford 2006, 37-95).  
These attributes of states basically cohere into a single quality – namely, 
effective authority over a particular jurisdiction. Effectiveness is the factor 
stressed in Crawford’s text as a generally necessary though not sufficient 
trait of a state. Consequently, since the history of establishing the conditions 
enabling effectiveness is bracketed out, in Crawford’s words, “an entity 
may become a State despite serious illegalities in the method or process of 
creation” (Crawford 2006, 89). I understand the category of religion to have 
gained traction as a technology of government partially as a mode of 
recompense, a technique of solution, for what Crawford terms “illegalities” 
in the foundation of states, particularly those with a recognized colonial 
past.  The illegalities of the past are sources of the anxieties of sovereignty 
in the present. 
Two significant features of states that Crawford does not mention 
are:  authority over violence and hegemonic masculinity.  It is the gaps and 
contradictions in governments’ management of violence and male 
dominance that give quasi states – i.e. religions – important entrees to 
increased power.  Max Weber identified jurisdiction over legalized violence 





as the one domain over which states do not relinquish control (Weber 2004 
[1919]).  The overt violence in martial or police form is jealously guarded as 
is the violence-in-waiting that is necessary to enforce court decisions. I 
argue that control over these varieties of violence is generally the dividing 
line between vestigial and dominant states.  Note that the label “religion” is 
often disputed when a group is seen to muster violent means to fulfil a goal 
or doctrine. This tendency is apparent in the invention of terms such as 
“Islamist” or “political Islam” to distinguish Islam as a “religion” in places 
in which Islam is not the governing ideology of a fully functioning state.   
Two exceptions to Weber’s dictum about the state’s exclusive control 
of most forms of violence are so-called domestic violence and the physical 
alteration of genitals of male and female infants. In these matters, 
jurisdiction over violence is sometimes handed over by proxy to faith-based 
arbitrations or to decisions of leaders in empowered, vestigial 
constituencies.  
Jurisdiction over the types of violence that states most readily 
franchise out is related to male dominance.  Religions, for the most part, 
insist on maintaining a male hierarchy and structure of decision-making in 
contrast to many of the states that authorize and contain them.  These 
dominant states have, for the last several decades, been according women 
greater power and influence.  One reason for this difference is that 
dominion over the family and a so-called private sphere of living is 
generally one jurisdiction that fully functioning states hand off in differing 
degrees to the marginalized states within them.   Although Saba Mahmood 
describes the development of what gets termed family law in Egypt 
differently, in her 2015 book Religious Difference in a Secular Age, she traces 
how domesticity becomes allotted to somewhat unique “Islamic” forms of 
governmentality (Mahmood 2015). This is the type of management 
tendency that in varied contexts and histories results in the modern and 
largely illusory creation of “private”, personal spaces over which religions 
are granted authority and influence. 
It has taken decades of feminist theory and activism to disturb the 
putative separation of what is termed politics from “personal” issues 
related to sex, marriage, child care, housework, and domestic abuse.  The 
deconstruction of the ideological pairing of the category of religion with the 
private and personal is a product of this discourse.  The second wave 
feminist slogan “the personal is political” confronts the illusion of religion 
as separate from politics as much as it does the fantasy of private, apolitical 
living spaces.  The slogan should always be paired with a sister dictum, 
namely:  The Religious is Political.  Although women’s domination occurs 
throughout culture, it is the imagined separateness of family, home, sex and 
reproduction which maintains oppression.  Positioning these spheres as the 
appropriate territories of religions, constructs women distinctively as the 
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unique subjects of two governmental orders – one that of the dominant 
state, the other that of the vestigial powers within it. 
Because displaced governing orders retain their sway in familial and 
sexual spheres of jurisdiction, religious authority in these venues is ripe for 
expansion as is happening in “faith-based” tribunals in various countries.   
In addition to widespread classification of the spheres of family, sex, 
and reproduction as ‘religious’ jurisdictions, gender hierarchy and privilege 
are also impacted by the nostalgia for male leadership preserved in what I 
am calling vestigial states. 
Despite some valiant and fascinating efforts to document a time in 
which women were in control of government in the deep past, such 
accounts are overwhelmed by the weight of recorded history.  Because 
religions, as restless once and future forms of government, are continually 
hearkening backwards to past models of leaders and patterns of authority; 
and because they derive legitimacy in large part because of perceived ties 
to these traditions, masculine hegemony is preserved within religions as if 
in amber.  
While it is true that female religious leaders are gaining prominence 
in many venues, progress is slow and undoubtedly hampered by the 
veneration of foundational texts that establish authoritative succession from 
male deities to the male avatars who resemble them. A famous example of 
this is Pope Paul VI’s ex cathedra (and still operational) statement in 1977 
reaffirming the exclusion of women from the priesthood: “The Christian 
priesthood is … of a sacramental nature: The priest is a sign, the 
supernatural effectiveness of which comes from the ordination received, 
but a sign that must be perceptible and which the faithful must be able to 
recognize with ease.  …Sacramental signs represent what they signify by 
natural resemblance.  … When Christ’s role in the eucharist is to be 
expressed sacramentally, there would not be this ‘natural resemblance’ 
which must exist between Christ and His minister if the role of Christ were 
not taken by a man.  In such a case it would be difficult to see in the minister 
the image of Christ.  For Christ himself was and remains a man” (New York 
Times, 1977).   
It is important to stress that in Catholicism as in other patriarchal 
traditions, male hegemony in all aspects including scriptural interpretation 
is being contested.  Success is so far limited.  Women in positions of ecclesial 
authority signal a newness that can in itself provoke anxiety; while male 
leaders offer the stable comfort of sameness. Male dominance in 
marginalized religious governments give support to masculine leadership 
in dominant states that often cite affinity with past sometimes biblical 
symbols of governance to shore up their own legitimacy.  “In God We 
Trust” is stamped on U.S. coinage and since 1954, “one nation under God” 
is recited in the Pledge of Allegiance.  Canadians rather recently went 
further – when in 1982 a constitution was ratified with the following first 





line: “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the 
supremacy of God and the rule of law..” (Constitution Act 1982).    
Fondness for leaning on divine models of male authority extends to 
contemporary Russia as well.  Vladimir Putin finds support in the Russian 
Orthodox church and seems delighted to be photographed alongside 
Patriarch Kirill.  President Putin is quoted as saying that the church has 
always “inspired people to constructive action and heroic deeds for the 
Fatherland” (Valente 2020). Members of the ragtag band Pussy Riot 
recognized the confluence of the dual mutually reinforcing patriarchies 
when in 2012, they sang a song in Moscow’s Christ Savior Cathedral that 
asked Mother Mary to rid their country of Putin.  Even though the church 
was largely empty at the time, the women were given two years of jail time 
for “a criminal act that went against tradition and … violated public order” 
(Elder 2012). The relatively heavy sentence confirmed the seriousness of the 
threat that the voices of three women in tights represent to the current male 
ruling order buttressed by Russian Christian orthodoxy.   
The obsessive construction and reconstruction of public 
governmentality as male is one thing that Freud stresses in his highly 
speculative account of the evolution of monotheism.  I find Freud’s 
description of the process of mystification and deification in relation to 
government is congruent with understanding the modern category of 
religion as a mechanism of statecraft.  Freud draws no distinction between 
“religion” – i.e. Jewish and Christian versions of monotheism - and the state 
in any of his work.  In Freud’s texts, theism is the distortion, idealization 
and glorification of past male rulers.  The Jewish and Christian images of 
God grow out of anxieties about the foundational traumas Freud posits - 
traumas that both ground and haunt male governance. 
Women are allowed public authority only in temporary, sporadic 
circumstances as figures of respite from the paranoid ferocity of male 
competitiveness. Freud draws no line between secular and religious 
spheres of authority in this narrative and does not remark on the overlap. 
All psychoanalytic theory about culture can appear awkward 
especially when conjecturing about aetiology such as the literal murder of 
primal fathers as depicted in Totem and Taboo (Freud 1913).  Nevertheless, 
psychoanalysis is useful in pointing out and elaborating persistent patterns 
that appear and reappear compulsively over long periods of time.  This 
recognition of repetition can move discursive boundaries, expand 
awareness and permit something new to happen.   
I suggest that the trauma that founds states – the “illegalities” to 
which Crawford refers in his text – are the various atrocities, displacements, 
appropriations, banishments and evictions – in the histories of most 
contemporary states.  Because religion, as I’m arguing, is one solution to the 
problem of how to maintain sovereignty over a diverse set of living subjects 
– it is a symptom of trauma and displacement that both covers up and 
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marks what was once done and/or what is currently excluded. The 
symptom, according to Freud, is always a compromise that pushes in one 
direction and pulls in another.  The behavioral structure designed to push 
away awareness of a disruptive truth paradoxically tugs cognizance of it 
toward consciousness. Each time Lady Macbeth washes her hands in 
pantomime, the horror of her crime comes more and more into focus and 
repression of her guilt over Duncan’s murder becomes less possible.    
 
The psychoanalytic metaphor of thinking about religion as a 
symptom does I think highlight the paradox of marginalization and 
empowerment that characterizes the category.  The position given to a 
religious group in a dominant state is always an unsettled compromise that 
vacillates between disenfranchisement and privilege; abjection and 
adulation. 
As restive structures of vestigial sovereignties that function as 
symptoms of that which has been displaced and/or disgraced, religions 
both generate (and soothe) anxieties of governments.  The vicissitudes of 
anxiety motivate action and policy. In Melanie Klein’s thought, anxiety 
operates in two modes – paranoid/schizoid and depressive (Klein 1975).  
The thorough genocide God commands in Deuteronomy can be seen as a 
paranoid response inspired by a fear of retaliation from within.  Over time, 
with some measure of stability and the solidification of his rule, this God 
might experience the more complex condition of depressive anxiety fueled 
by a measure of guilt that could inspire some reparative gestures – such as, 
perhaps, the creation of religion instead of the enactment of genocide. 
In Kleinian theory, guilt and its vicissitudes are veritable engines of 
culture:  she and theorists influenced by her work, have written that high 
art, theatre, opera, literature, architecture and philosophy as well as 
everyday habits and practices are initiated and sustained by need for 
reparative expression and satisfaction.  I want to add governmental 
formations – in particular religion -  to the list of cultural creations that 
Freudian and post-Freudian theory links to deep and enduring 
psychological dynamics.  
I find the Kleinian perspective expansive because it opens up 
awareness of the emotional and perceptual resonance of all cultural form. 
Such thinking, I suggest, disaggregates political environments by 
contextualizing and historicizing ideas and institutions against a 
background of human vulnerability and affect.  
I’ll conclude by mentioning the work of another brilliant 
psychoanalytic writer in the Kleinian tradition – Wilfred Bion.  In “A Theory 
of Thinking,” Bion proposes the metaphoric, discursive existence of two 
elements at play in mental processes – alpha and beta (Bion, 1962).  Alpha 
elements function as building materials for thinking – they can be joined to 
other alphas in constructions.  They can be disassembled and reassembled, 





and reconfigured if and when necessary.  They are, as it were, lego for the 
mind – if lego parts could be imagined not as solid plastic but rather made 
of sticky clay. In contrast, there are betas – which are impossible to 
incorporate – they are hard round huge marbles with definite and 
impermeable borders and boundaries.  Betas do not join up, are not subject 
to revision, and cannot be made flexible in psychic constructions.  They are 
the stuff of psychosis, catatonic stasis and, at times, extreme violence.  
Except of course if they become alphas – which does happen if their 
discursive limits can be breached.     
As scholars, writers, theorists, we work with alpha elements and 
help produce them for others.  Two examples of recent books that make this 
effort are Nelson Tebbe’s Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age (Tebbe 2017) 
and Cecile Laborde’s Liberalism’s Religion (Laborde 2017).  Tebbe proposes 
a method to approach controversies pertaining to equality rights and so-
called religious” objections to those rights.  His stated goal is to foster what 
he terms “social coherence” through reasoned dialogue with ground rules 
based on principles each side can accept.  Outcomes are not predetermined.  
To create a focused but open-ended climate for discussion, issues and 
categories – religion among them – must be disassembled, i.e. broken down 
to evaluate behaviors in particular circumstances. Laborde pushes in a 
similar direction toward more careful appraisals of specifics related to what 
counts as “religion” in relation to living a “good” life.  A flaw in Laborde’s 
work is that she refers to “religion as such”- an impossible category that she 
ought to have disassembled.   Yet in clearer parts of her text, she calls for a 
“move away from the category of religion altogether” (Laborde 2017, 238). 
I agree with this suggestion wholeheartedly.   
I noted an example of better discourse when I read various news 
reports about the 2018 abortion referendum in the Republic of 
Ireland.  Relatively few journalists referred to the vote as involving the 
influence of the vague, generalized category of ‘religion.’ The focus was on 
the Catholic Church as a particular institution.  Such specificity yields a 
clarity that I hope becomes less rare.     
Both Tebbe and Laborde encourage a collective effort at what Bion 
considers thinking – namely the activity of disassembling and reassembling 
components of experience to construct discourse whose borders and 
boundaries can allow and contain the affective life of a diverse population.   
It is worth noting that liberalism as it is often described – is 
concerned with promoting “the Good” and not “the Great.”  Positing a large 
scale grandiose goal of national greatness is, in the trajectory of 
psychoanalytic theory that I am citing, the stuff of idealization and 
concomitant denigration – the favored mode of tyrants and demagogues 
who tend toward final solutions involving the purging of difference from 
national borders as depicted in Deuteronomy. 
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If “religion” is thought of as a unique, separate entity – if this 
category is imagined as an “it” that is too, shall we say, “sacred”, special, 
miraculous -  it can behave as a beta element – as inaccessible, and 
impermeable to reformulations that compose salutary cultural life. 
Persistent presentations of religion or of a deity as absolute and 
unconditioned can become magnets for quasi-psychotic authoritarian –
beta-like discourse of both grievance and triumph.  Understanding religion 
as an invention in the technology of statecraft that functions as both solution 
to and symptom of ever-present tensions of governance is a suggestion that 
is depressive (in the best Kleinian sense of that term) – it is a bit of theory 
that turns away from dramatic abstraction for the sake of promoting 
sustainable – yet intermittent - sanity. 
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